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Abstract 
This paper investigates the association between intelligence and military expenditure, 
across 159 nations during the 1990-2013 period. The econometric results we provide are 
surprising. On one hand, we fail to confirm that intelligence has monotonic effect on military 
spending. However, the results also suggest a novel type of intelligence-military spending nexus. 
In particular, the regression estimates show that there is inverted U-shaped relationship between 
IQ and military expenditure. From a policy perspective these findings suggest that cognitive 
development that increases military expenditures is sustainable so long as defense sector has 
positive spillovers on economic and social well-being. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Over the past decade, growing attention has been devoted to investigate the reasons for, 
and economic consequences of, intelligence1. Related literature can be divided into two major 
lines. The first group of studies investigates the antecedents of intelligence (e.g. Kanazawa, 
2012). For example, empirical studies suggest thataverage annual temperature (Vanhanen, 2009), 
latitude (Templer, 2008), and historical prevalence of infectious diseases (Epigg et al., 2010) are 
causal to intelligence.  
Another line of studies explores the consequences of intelligence. Although much work 
has been done on the relationship between intelligence and economic outcomes (Weede & 
Kampf, 2002; Daniele, 2013; Burhan et al., 2014; Salahodjaev 2015a, Salahodjaev, 2015b), we 
are not aware of any empirical evidence that estimates the effect of intelligence on military 
expenditure. That is the aim of this study. 
Military spending has important implications for public. In particularly, excess spending 
on the defense sector reduces private investments, present consumption and inhibits long run 
economic growth. Hewitt (1992, p. 107) comments that ‘military expenditure is an inefficient 
means of promoting economic growth compared, for instance, to private investment expenditure 
or government expenditure on public infrastructure and human capital’.Therefore, understanding 
the determinants of military spending has been an important object of research in empirical 
literature, especially over the last decade 
                                                            
1 See e.g. Lynn &Vanhanen (2012a) for an excellent review 
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Several arguments suggest negative link between intelligence and military 
expenditure.First, while some authors conjecture that spending on the military has positive short-
run effects (e.g. Wing, 1991; Lin et al., 2015), there is abundant evidence that military 
expenditure deteriorating has long-run implications. For example, Findlay & Parker (1992) show 
that there is positive link between military spendingand interest rates in the United States.  
Also, Dunne et al. (2004), using data on 11 small industrializing countries for the period 
1960-2000, find that military burden does have significant effect on the size of external debt 
relative to GDP. In this line, military expenditure increases inflation (Heo, 1998; Tzeng et al., 
2008), unemployment rates (Dunne and Smith, 1990), reduces available resources for productive 
activities, such as investment in human skills and health care, and may inhibit long run economic 
growth (Dunne, 2012). Consequently, we expect that there is less military spending in high-IQ 
nations because intelligent individuals have longer time preferences (Jones & Podemska, 2010) 
and ‘make choices that focus on generating long-run rather than short-run gains’ (Squalli, 2014 
p. 34). For example, empirical literature reports that intelligence is negatively associated with 
deforestation rates (Salahodjaev, 2016).  
Second, because government is the exclusive provider of defense services, military 
spending creates room for corruption. Restricted competition among providers may foster rent 
seeking and can increase the fraction of bureaucrats that find it appealing to further increase arms 
spending and accept bribes in exchange for arms contracts. On the other hand, intelligence is 
negatively related to corruption (Potrafke, 2012) and shadow economy (Salahodjaev, 2015a). 
Nie et al. (1996) offers and explanation of this relationship. Because educated economic agents 
have higher returns from political participation, more likely to vote in elections and engage in 
political campaigns, intelligent citizens limit government (political participation and political 
checks and balances), and increase public accountability. In particular, Berinsky & Lenz (2011) 
investigate the causality between education and political participation using Current Population 
Survey. The authors find positive link between education and the propensity to vote. More 
recently, Solon (2014) re-examines the link between intelligence as a proxy for educational and 
political experience. The findings show that higher intelligence fosters liberalism and 
prosociality. Similarly, intelligence moderates the effect of democracy on economic growth in 
cross-country growth regressions (Salahodjaev, 2015c).  
On the other hand, intelligence may also have a positive effect on military expenditure. 
While theory conjectures that cognitive skillspredict the quality of institutions (Kanayama, 
2014), there is evidence thatcivil liberties and democratic institutions do not insure against onset 
of conflicts (Dudley & Montmarquette, 1981; Harrison & Wolf, 2012). Moreover, many high-IQ 
nations that are limited democracies more likely to be vulnerable to military conflicts (Baliga et 
al., 2011). Albalete et al. (2012), using a dataset containing information on 157 countries, find 
support for guns and butter nexus. The authors report that presidential democratic regimes have 
higher shares of military expenditure in GDP relative to parliamentary systems.  
Another reason to anticipate positive link between intelligence and military expenditure 
is risk aversion. Empirical evidence supplies abundant evidence that higher cognitive abilities 
predict risk aversion (Benjamin et al., 2013; Frederick, 2006) and greater patience (Shamosh& 
Gray, 2008). For example, using web-based experiment of 1250 individuals, Oechssler et al. 
(2009) find a positive correlation between Cognitive Reflection Test scores and sure payments: 
in other words intelligence increases risk aversion. If national military expenditure measures 
perception of possible risks and threats (Collier, 2006), we might therefore anticipate that 
nation’s cognitive abilities will have positive effect on the share of defense spending in GDP. 
Further, educated individual tends to maximize his/her social welfare function (Frey & 
Stutzer, 2000). In this vein, we expect that more intelligent societies, driven by pro-social 
motivation (Millet & Dewitte, 2007), may spend more on military programs (‘peace dividend’ 
hypothesis) because defense is a genuine public good. In a similar line, Collier & Hoeffler 
(2007) show that GDP per person has a positive and statistically significant effect on military 
expenditure. 
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Therefore, this paper explores the link between intelligence and spending on the military, 
using cross-section of countries. To our knowledge, this is the first study to empirically relating 
military spending with intelligence of nation. The econometric results we provide are surprising. 
On one hand, we fail to confirm that intelligence has monotonic effect on military spending. 
However, the results also suggest a novel type of intelligence-military spending nexus. In 
particular, the regression estimates show that there is inverted U-shaped relationship between IQ 
and military expenditure. This indicates that during initial stage of cognitive development, some 
form of military spending is unavoidable, but increasing intelligence would eventually create 
incentives to reduce military expenditures. Consequently, one of the policy suggestions of these 
findings is that cognitive development that increases military expenditures is sustainable so long 
as defense sector has positive spillovers on economic and social well-being (e.g. Kentor& Kick, 
2008).   
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents data and methodology. Section 3 
discusses the main results and Section 4 provides robustness tests. Finally, Section 5 concludes 
the paper. 
 
2. Data and methods 
 
In the subsequent sections, we proceed with cross-country regression analysis of military 
expenditure rates across 159 nations during the 1990-2013 period. Table 1A lists all the countries 
included in the dataset. Although controlling for time effects would be ideal here, the presence of 
a variable that is constant over such periods of time, namely intelligence, may create 
multicollinearity issues, especially in the fixed effects setting. Therefore, we rely on 
conventional ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions.  
Our main variable of interest is a measure of intelligence. Although, a universal measure 
of intelligence is lacking in the literature, various aspects of intelligence are often suggested in 
the different interpretations depending on the aim of study. However, on the macroeconomic 
level intelligence is proxied by national IQ scores. In line with extant studies, our preferred 
proxy for intelligence is from Lynn & Vanhanen (2012b). In this dataset national IQ scores 
proxy overall measure of intelligence in country (see e.g. Salahodjaev, 2015d; Belasen & Hafer, 
2013).  
In this paper we use two independent proxies for military expenditure: military 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP (military) and arms imports relative to the size of economy 
(GDP) (import).We take the natural logarithm of these variables in the regressions. 
Military is the most commonly used measure of defense spending in extant studies 
because, by definition, it captures military spending.Military expenditure data include all current 
and capital spending on: (a) the armed forces, including peacekeeping forces; (b) defense 
ministries and other government agencies involved in military projects; (c) paramilitary forces; 
and (d) military space activities. Such expenditures should include: (a) military and civil 
personnel, including retirement pensions of military personnel and social services for personnel; 
(b) operations and maintenance; (c) procurement; (d) military research and development; and (e) 
military aid (in the military expenditure of the donor country).The data is from Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). 
In order to increase confidence of our findings, we also use imports of arms relative to 
GDP.This variablecaptures the supply of military weapons through sales, aid, gifts, and those 
made through manufacturing licenses. Data cover major conventional weapons such as aircraft, 
armored vehicles, artillery, radar systems, missiles, and ships designed for military use. The data 
is from World Development Indicators. 
As control variables, we include FDI, Democratic index (democracy), government 
expenditure relative to GDP (gcons), and GDP per capita. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics.  
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Description Mean (Std. dev.) 
Military (log) Military expenditure (% of GDP) 
Source: SIPRI 
0.6355 (0.7859) 
Import (log) Logged arms imports (% of GDP) 
Source: SIPRI 
-0.9746 (1.5063) 
IQ National IQ 
Source: Lynn &Vanhanen (2012) 
84.1026 (10.8475) 
FDI Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP) 
Source: World Bank 
36.9799 (61.3759) 
Y/L(log) GDP per capita  
Source: World Bank 
7.9530 (1.6190) 
Democracy Average of political rights and civil liberty scores 
Source: Freedom House 
4.1257 (2.0920) 
Gcons (log) General government consumption expenditure (% of GDP) 
Source: World Bank 
16.8148 (8.8748) 
 
 
 
Figure I Scatter plot and curve estimation of military against level of intelligence 
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Figure II Scatter plot and curve estimation of import against level of intelligence 
 
 
 
Formally, we estimate the following linearregression: 
iiiii XIQIQY  
2
210      (1) 
 
where Y is the dependent variable, IQ is measure for intelligence and X is the set of 
control variables. Since preliminary results suggest that intelligence has inverted U-shaped effect 
on military spending we add its squared term in all specifications. We introduce control variables 
gradually in the empirical analysis. 
Note that heteroskedasticity is a common issue in cross-country linear regressions. To 
address this problem we estimate heteroskedasticity adjusted robust standard errors in STATA 
13.  
3. Results 
 
Figures I and II that plot the level of intelligence (using national IQs) against dependent 
variables strongly suggest non-monotonic effect of intelligence on military expenditure. The 
curve estimations in Figures I and II take the pattern of a reversed-U-shaped.   
Econometric results are presented in Tables 2 and 3. The dependent variable in Table 2 is 
logged military spending to GDP (military). Models 1 and 2 are estimated excluding control 
variables. The bivariate regression in model 1 fails to find statistically significant linear effect of 
intelligence on military. In particular the Ramsey RESET test applied here suggests that squared 
term of intelligence should be added in the regression (p<.05). Including squared IQ 
substantially improves the model. First, Ramsey test now rejects regression misspecification 
(p=0.75). Intelligence and its squared term are now significant at the 5% level.Moreover, the 
results confirm the existence of inverted U shaped link between intelligence and military.The 
turning point of the curve is around 87.5points, which equals to national IQ scores of Brazil, but 
less than the IQ scores of Mexico. We include GDP per capita and democratic index in model 3. 
As expected a positive coefficient for GDP per capita is produced; likewise, a negative and 
significant, at the 1% level, estimate for democratic index is obtained, and the inverted U-shaped 
link between IQ and militaryis replicated. The turning point now is around 89.5 points. 
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While FDI has a negative connection to military, the non-linear effect of intelligence on 
military remains intact (in model 4).Finally, we control for government consumption relative to 
GDP in model 5. The full model explains 28.2 percent of cross-country differences in military 
spending. The inverted U-shaped effect of intelligence remains intact, and the turning point is 
now around 90 points. Turning to control variables, when government consumption rises by 10 
percents, average long run military expenditure increases by 5 percents.In line with related 
studies, the estimates show that nations with higher level of liberties are associated with lower 
military spending (e.g. Dunne & Freeman, 2003). 
 
Table 2 
Intelligence and military expenditure: OLS regression 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
IQ 0.0057 0.1925** 0.1433* 0.1374* 0.1440* 
 (0.0058) (0.0852) (0.0726) (0.0746) (0.0789) 
IQ2  -0.0011** -0.0008* -0.0007* -0.0008* 
  (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) 
Y/L   0.1531*** 0.1583*** 0.0917* 
   (0.0460) (0.0451) (0.0505) 
Democracy    -0.2193*** -0.2221*** -0.2152*** 
   (0.0394) (0.0391) (0.0385) 
FDI    -0.0131** -0.0133** 
    (0.0065) (0.0062) 
Gcons     0.5132*** 
     (0.1832) 
ERI 2.5558*** 2.4978*** 2.6391*** 2.6481*** 2.0447*** 
 (0.0875) (0.0849) (0.1052) (0.1038) (0.2256) 
Constant 0.1342 -7.5572** -7.8941** -7.6497** -8.8269** 
 (0.5040) (3.5869) (3.1769) (3.2524) (3.5536) 
N 159 159 156 156 156 
adj. R2 0.0594 0.0848 0.2372 0.2416 0.2822 
Turning point - 87.50 89.56 98.14 90.0 
Notes: the dependent variable is military. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
(Figure 1 illustrates why we included Eritrea (ERI)) 
 
In Table 3 we consider a different measure of military expenditure, namely logged armed 
imports relative to GDP. Model 1 shows that intelligence is negative and statistically significant 
at the 1% level. In short, a one standard deviation increase in national IQ is associated with 0.38 
percent decrease in long run military imports as a share of GDP. However, as in Table 2, 
Ramsey test fails to reject that model has no omitted variables (p=.0001). Consequently, adding 
squared IQ in model 2 supports statistically significant inverted U-shaped link between IQ and 
import. The estimated turning point for IQ is at 77.26 points. 
Including control variables in models 3 to 6 yields statistically significant coefficients for 
IQ and IQ2. After controlling for suggested antecedents of military expenditures (model 6) we 
find that the turning point is 84.29 which isalso equal to the national IQ score for Brazil. Turning 
to control variables we find that democracy has negative effect on import. Interestingly, 
coefficient on gcons and FDI is positive but not significant, suggesting that government 
consumptionand foreign direct investment has no discernible effect on the arms transfers. 
 
Table 3 
Intelligence and military expenditure: OLS regression 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
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IQ -0.0355*** 0.3863** 0.3853** 0.3079** 0.3162** 0.3203** 
 (0.0101) (0.1696) (0.1593) (0.1537) (0.1537) (0.1585) 
IQ2  -0.0025** -0.0023** -0.0018** -0.0018** -0.0019** 
  (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) 
Y/L   -0.2612*** -0.1311 -0.1303 -0.1605 
   (0.0969) (0.0865) (0.0874) (0.1008) 
Democracy    -0.2577*** -0.2637*** -0.2601*** 
    (0.0738) (0.0761) (0.0772) 
FDI     0.0082 0.0085 
     (0.0252) (0.0248) 
Gcons      0.2590 
      (0.3234) 
GNQ 3.7790*** 4.0473*** 3.9741*** 3.6105*** 3.3989*** 3.4643*** 
 (0.1625) (0.1801) (0.1855) (0.1998) (0.6393) (0.6516) 
Constant  1.9104** -15.4821** -14.5907** -14.0642** -14.4776** -15.1252** 
 (0.8310) (6.9218) (6.5634) (6.5569) (6.5959) (6.9970) 
N 159 159 156 154 153 153 
adj. R2 0.1188 0.1626 0.1988 0.2771 0.2745 0.2732 
Turning 
point 
- 77.26 83.76 85.52 87.83 84.29 
Notes: the dependent variable is import. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
(Figure 2 illustrates why we includedEquatorial Guinea (GNQ)) 
 
4. Robustness tests 
 
We perform several robustness checks. Hewitt (1992) argues that motives for military 
spending vary greatly among developing and developed nations.He concludes that the 
antecedents for military expenditure may have different impacts based on nation’s 
distinctiveness. For example, Middle East countries tend to have higher levels of military 
expenditure. This implies that the effect of intelligence on defense spending is robustly 
heterogeneous. Ignoring, this may significantly distort the results. Further, presence of outlying 
countries may also lead to biased estimates of mean regressions. To address this issue we rely on 
quantile regression by Koenker (2005). This approach enables us to understand the drivers of 
military spending by analyzing different quantiles. The results for military and import are 
reported in Tables 4 and 5 respectively.  
Table 4 shows that the U-shaped link between IQ and military is statistically significant 
in quantiles 0.4 to 0.8. The quantile regression suggests IQ is non-significant for countries with 
low spending on the military. Note that the turning points remain essentially similar, ranging 
from 86.10 to 88.16. The results suggest that even after accounting for multiple determinants of 
spending on the military and heterogeneity of nations, U-shaped link between IQ and military is 
relatively robust.   
The effect of FDI on military expenditure increases for high military spending 
countries.As anticipated, government consumption is positive and statistically significant. For 
quantile 0.5, a 10percent increase in government consumption is associated with increase in 
military expenditure by 5.8percents.In contrast to OLS regression,income is positive and 
significant at the 10% level only in quantile 0.8.  
 
 
 
Table 4 
Intelligence and military expenditure:  quantile regression 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
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Q 0.2 Q 0.4 Q 0.5 Q 0.6 Q 0.8 
IQ 0.0702 0.1587* 0.1722** 0.2589*** 0.2103** 
 (0.0934) (0.0853) (0.0810) (0.0686) (0.1036) 
IQ2 -0.0003 -0.0009* -0.0010** -0.0015*** -0.0012* 
 (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0006) 
Y/L 0.0806 0.0610 0.0779 0.0376 0.1333* 
 (0.0644) (0.0645) (0.0616) (0.0534) (0.0679) 
Democracy  -0.1538*** -0.1775*** -0.2100*** -0.1965*** -0.1981*** 
 (0.0486) (0.0438) (0.0426) (0.0366) (0.0509) 
FDI -0.0100 -0.0133* -0.0145** -0.0159** -0.0181 
 (0.0089) (0.0076) (0.0072) (0.0063) (0.0115) 
Gcons 0.4055** 0.4648** 0.5884*** 0.6920*** 0.5187** 
 (0.1968) (0.1869) (0.1799) (0.1521) (0.2212) 
Constant -5.5896 -8.7640** -9.7362*** -13.1561*** -10.7478** 
 (3.8549) (3.5227) (3.3688) (2.8810) (4.2553) 
N 156 156 156 156 156 
Turning point n.s. 88.16 86.10 86.30 87.62 
Notes: the dependent variable is military. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 
Table 5 also reports the results for import. In contrast to the estimates in Table 4, 
intelligence is non-significantly linked to import for the last quantile. The turning point for the 
import ranges from 85.96 to 91.2. Further, the magnitude of the estimates for democracy 
decreases for high arms importing countries. Throughout the regression we fail to find statistical 
evidence for the impact of income.  
 
Table 5 
Intelligence and military expenditure: quantile regression 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
IQ 0.1824* 0.5332*** 0.5205** 0.4814*** 0.2060 
 (0.1071) (0.1478) (0.2149) (0.1498) (0.2064) 
IQ2 -0.0010* -0.0031*** -0.0030** -0.0028*** -0.0013 
 (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0009) (0.0012) 
Y/L -0.0677 -0.0655 -0.1164 -0.0983 -0.0079 
 (0.0876) (0.1115) (0.1594) (0.1204) (0.1534) 
Democracy  -0.4350*** -0.4020*** -0.3023*** -0.2769*** -0.2516** 
 (0.0565) (0.0739) (0.1067) (0.0793) (0.1211) 
FDI -0.0058 0.0472** 0.0334 0.0216 0.0845*** 
 (0.0101) (0.0224) (0.0278) (0.0182) (0.0259) 
Gcons 0.5865* 0.4065 0.4710 0.5707 -0.4000 
 (0.2978) (0.3509) (0.4992) (0.3639) (0.4955) 
Constant -12.6230*** -26.5663*** -24.7703*** -22.8578*** -8.4985 
 (4.5215) (6.2206) (9.0411) (6.3827) (9.0728) 
N 153 153 153 153 153 
Turning point 91.2 86.00 86.75 85.96 n.s. 
Notes: the dependent variable is import. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 
We also replicated equation (1) using alternative vector of control variables. In order to 
prevent for omitted variable bias we included average level of military expenditure in the 
geographic region (region). For example, Hewitt (1992) argues that excess military expenditure 
by one nation establish a negative externality to adjacent nations. We included dummy variables 
for socialist and oil exporting countries, to capture indirect effect of country specific 
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characteristics on military expenditure.  
Finally, we control for the effect of demographic structure, measured by age dependency 
ration, on demand for defense spending. The results are presented in Table 6. Controlling for 
alternative determinants of defense burden does not change the inference that intelligence has a 
non-linear influence on the military expenditure. The average level of military expenditure in the 
geographic region has significant, at the 1% level, impact on all measures of military 
expenditure. For example, its estimate is positiveand significant at the 5% level for military 
spending relative to GDP. Demographic structure as approximated by age dependency ratio, has 
a positive, albeit non- effect on dependent variables.  
 
Table 6 
Robustness test: alternative control variables 
 
 (1) (2) 
IQ 0.3586** 0.1414* 
 (0.1704) (0.0785) 
IQ2 -0.0023** -0.0007* 
 (0.0010) (0.0004) 
Neighbor  1.2403*** 0.9611*** 
 (0.2326) (0.1717) 
Age  0.0004 0.0084 
 (0.0075) (0.0054) 
Oil exporting -0.5558** 0.1854 
 (0.2451) (0.1485) 
Socialist  0.2991 0.0308 
 (0.2641) (0.1125) 
Constant  -15.1498** -7.0853* 
 (7.3529) (3.6746) 
N 157 157 
adj. R2 0.2247 0.2335 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Several studies have tested the effect of intelligence on socio-economic outcomes, but the 
link between IQ and military expenditure has not been investigated. This paper investigates the 
association between intelligence and defenseburden,and documents robust U-shaped empirical 
regularity between them. In addition to cognitive skills political regimes and government 
consumption has also statistically significant effect on military expenditure.  
In particular, the results from quantile regressions show that our findings are substantially 
consistent, indicating that there are statistically signi cant and quantitatively important link 
between intelligence and military spending, both at mean level and across heterogeneous sample 
of countries. The increase in intelligence is crucial for reduction in spending on the military in 
the countries with the IQ scores above 86-88 points. Contrary cognitive development below the 
turning may be associated with increase in defense spending for low IQ nations.  
What drives the allegedly inverted U-shaped curve, and the moderate regularity of its 
statistical shape in developed and developing nations, is unknown. Provisionally:  
- We conjecture that societies tend to demand greater security at the early stages of 
development, and reaching approximately 85 IQ points tend to revise their demand for 
 10 
 
defense spending. It seems that psychological factors play role in transforming the 
anticipated linear link between intelligence and defense burden to non-monotonic pattern. 
- Alternatively – though it may be possibly a small part of the evidence - is that a particular 
military/peace treaty agreement is likely to be signed preferentially in higher IQ nations 
first with a momentary lag prior it is signed in the majority of less cognitively developed 
nations.  
 
It is possible that the avenue for future research is to investigate the causes of the inverted 
U-shaped pattern. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1 
List of countries 
Albania Dominican  Rep. Lao PDR Romania 
Algeria Ecuador Latvia Russian Federation 
Angola Egypt, Arab Rep. Lebanon Rwanda 
Argentina El Salvador Lesotho Saudi Arabia 
Armenia Equatorial Guinea Liberia Senegal 
Australia Eritrea Libya Serbia 
Austria Estonia Lithuania Seychelles 
Azerbaijan Ethiopia Luxembourg Sierra Leone 
Bahrain Fiji Macedonia, FYR Singapore 
Bangladesh Finland Madagascar Slovak Republic 
Belarus France Malawi Slovenia 
Belgium Gabon Malaysia South Africa 
Belize Gambia, The Mali Spain 
Benin Georgia Malta Sri Lanka 
Bolivia Germany Mauritania Sudan 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Ghana Mauritius Swaziland 
Botswana Greece Mexico Sweden 
Brazil Guatemala Moldova Switzerland 
Brunei Darussalam Guinea Mongolia Syrian Arab Republic 
Bulgaria Guinea-Bissau Montenegro Tajikistan 
Burkina Faso Guyana Morocco Tanzania 
Burundi Haiti Mozambique Thailand 
Cambodia Honduras Namibia Togo 
Cameroon Hungary Nepal Trinidad and Tobago 
Canada Iceland Netherlands Tunisia 
Cape Verde India New Zealand Turkey 
Central African Republic Indonesia Nicaragua Turkmenistan 
Chad Iran, Islamic Rep. Niger Uganda 
Chile Iraq Nigeria Ukraine 
China Ireland Norway United Arab Emirates 
Colombia Israel Oman United Kingdom 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Italy Panama United States 
Congo, Rep. Japan Papua New Guinea Uruguay 
Cote d'Ivoire Jordan Paraguay Uzbekistan 
Croatia Kazakhstan Peru Venezuela, RB 
Cyprus Kenya Philippines Vietnam 
Czech Republic Korea, Rep. Poland Yemen, Rep. 
Denmark Kuwait Portugal Zambia 
Djibouti Kyrgyz Republic Qatar Zimbabwe 
 
 
